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The major weapon system requirements determination
process should lead to optimum solutions to meet perceived
defense mission deficiencies. This thesis raises the
question of whether the existing requirements process is
adequate to support optimum solutions to meet defense
mission needs.
Principal areas of concern which affect the soundness
of the requirements determination function are addressed.
These include:
a. Adequacy of information used for threat analysis.
b. The process of selecting specific requirements.
c. The timeliness and adequacy of information provided
to the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
The thesis is intended as a conceptual problem statement
regarding the function of requirements determination rather
than as an across the board attempt to reconcile current
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In order to meet the challenge of declining defense
budgets and increasing weapon system costs we must choose
wisely and manage well in the complex environment of major
weapon systems acquisition. The general impression today is
that the challenge is not being successfully met. The process
used to acquire major weapon systems has been scrutinized
for over a decade. Twice in the 1960's the Secretary of
Defense made significant policy changes in an effort to
change perceived weaknesses in the process. Policy changes
have been made on a piecemeal basis however and there is
growing concern that new policies are not directed at cor-
recting deficiencies that are at the root of many acquisition
problems. The findings of several recent study groups indi-
cate that problems which appear during the system acquisition
cycle can be traced directly to shortcoming in the require-
1
ments determination process.
The requirements process is complex, unstructured,
variable and not fully understood by participants or observers.
It is characterized by widely diffused decision-making
responsibilities and by low visibility of key requirements
decisions. The process varies from Service to Service and
i
Study groups recommending improvements in the require-
ments determination process include: The Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel, the Commission on Government Procurement, the Defense
Science Board and the General Accounting Office.

weapon system to weapon system. It is influenced by changes
in procurement policy, by changes in the economic and
political environment and by the actions of participants in
the process. It is this seemingly endless variety of the
process that makes it difficult to analyze and control.
There is an immediate need to improve DoD management
control and decision making in all phases of requirements
determination,. When this phase of systems acquisition is
poorly managed the results are manifested in systems that
are: too costly, too complex, unreliable, inefficient,
incapable of meeting existing or forecast threats or designed
to counter non-existant threats.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to examine the DoD require-
ments determination process and identify key phases of the
process that are common to all weapon systems and Services.
These key phases are then used to formulate a conceptual
model of the process. The model is thoroughly analyzed and
is used to identify deficiencies in requirements management
control and decision making. Changes that will correct
these deficiencies are then recommended. The recommendations
include considerations of:
a. Who should be responsible for review of and
control over the various phases of requirements
determination.
b. What type of control should be exercised over
each phase of requirements determination.
6

c. The type of information decision makers require
in order to exercise effective control.
C. DEFINITION OF TERMS
1. Major Weapon System
For purposes of this paper a major weapon system is
defined as a collection of interrelated parts that combine
to perform a specific function to meet a specific need.
Cost guidelines of over 50 million dollars for Research
Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) or production costs
estimated to be in excess of 200 million dollars will be
used to identify current major systems. Equivalent cost
guidelines will be used for weapon systems examples cited
that were developed in the 1950's and 1960's.
2. Military Needs and Requirements
A need exists at the time it becomes known that a
mission deficiency exists or may exist at some time in the
future. The need may be caused by a change in an existing
mission, a new threat, or simply the obsolescence of the
means available to perform the mission. The requirement
is the type of approach or system that is selected to fulfill
a need. A defense requirement is the particular system
approach selected using some means of analysis to choose
from possible alternatives. A requirement can also be
"generated" by the development of new technology. In this
case there may be no mission deficiency but the new technology
may suggest a system approach to perform an existing mission
in a more effective manner. It is emphasized that a need

should not imply a particular system approach. A need is
a perception which should be independent of the require-
ment ultimately selected to meet the need.
3. Requirements Determination Process
The requirements determination process should be
the effort to find the most efficient means to satisfy the
need. The most efficient means is that one which best
reconciles the cost, time and capability goals in meeting
a need.
D. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION MODEL
All major weapon systems pass through the following
four phases or decision points during the requirements
determination process:
Phase I: Formal statement of needed capability.
Phase II: Selection of requirement.
Phase III: Secretary of Defense approval.
Phase IV: Congressional approval.
1. Formal Statement of Needed Capability
The formal statement of needed capability is an
interpretation of a mission deficiency by one or more of
the Services. The need results from examination of national
policy, perceived enemy threat and ability of current forces
to counter the threat. Obsolete weapons may also create
a "need" for a new capability.
2o Selection of Requirement
Research and development agencies in the Services
then search for approaches to satisfy the statement of need.
8

Systems analysis and early development prototyping may
also be techniques in the selection process for determining
the effective approach. The nature of the effort used to
select an approach is dependent upon how the statement of
need is presented. A statement that describes in detail
the type of system, desired characteristics and performance
specifications may limit alternatives or even predetermine
a single approach. Needs stated in terms of the mission
to be accomplished rather than as an outline of a predeter-
mined solution gives much more flexibility to decision
makers in Phase II of the process.
3. Secretary of Defense Approval
Once an approach to the problem has been adopted
by the Service, development in that area continues until
technical risk is thought to be reduced to an acceptable
level and the program is presented to the Secretary of
Defense for a confirming decision. It is possible that
more than one program may be deemed necessary to provide
a timely solution to a need either within a service or
among services.
Secretary of Defense approval is necessary for the
process to produce a systems approach that is presented to
Congress for appropriation of funds. Without a Secretary
of Defense approval, the process returns to the second
i
Systems analysis is the investigation and comparison
of the effectiveness and costs of alternative means (systems)
of accomplishing a stated objective. Here the objective
is meeting a "need."

phase of the process. The decision at the Secretary of
Defense level should be made with regard to activities
conducted by the other Services to meet related need but
frequently has not been predicated on this total view of
a defense mission area.
4* Congressional Approval
The last step in the process is program approval
by Congress. Although Congress normally doesn't determine
requirements, no program will proceed without appropriations.
Furthermore, Congressional review provides the opportunity
for a Service to make a plea for a program which was dis-
approved in Phase III or for Congress to impose its own
view of selected defense needs.
5. Conceptual Model
Figure 1 depicts the events and flow of information
through a model of the requirements determination process.
Each phase is discussed in detail in the following sections.
II. STATEMENT OF NEEDED CAPABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The first step in the proposed conceptual model of
the major weapon system requirements determination process
is a formal statement of needed capability. Statements of
needed capability are documents produced by each of the
services which state required capabilities for specific
warfare areas such as "strategic offense" or "tactical air
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and development planners and should contain the following
type of information: statements of mission deficiencies,
desired levels of mission capabilities to be achieved, the
time frame in which the capability is desired and the range
of costs which can be expected to be allocated for resolu-
tion of the mission deficiency. There are two general
categories of need statements originating from the Services,
"product oriented" and "mission oriented." The first is
a statement that specifies a particular system approach to
meet a perceived need. Product oriented statements of
need may define definite design concepts including detailed
characteristics of a complete weapon system approach. These
documents specify the solution when often their real purpose
should be to state the problems in terms of mission defi-
ciencies. A mission deficiency is the inability of a Service
or Services to carry out stated National Security Policy
objectives in a particular warfare area. Mission oriented
statements of need should present the needs without neces-
sarily including predetermined design approaches for meeting
the needs. For example, if the mission was rapid worldwide
deployment of men and material, the statement of needed
capability should describe the time factor, number of men,
size and amount of material and so on. The statement should
not describe an aircraft with specific characteristics to
accomplish the "need."
Presently the individual Services "are responsible
for identifying needs and defining, developing and producing
systems to satisfy those needs." [Ref. 9] Each of the
12

Services have plans that identify mission deficiencies and
describe the long-range and mid-range forces and weapons
they feel will be needed to carry out their roles and mis-
sions in the future. The planning methodology for the
estimation of future military needs differs from Service
to Service, In general however statements of needed
capability are written by planning activities within the
Services using the following sources of information: esti-
mates of the future world situation; analysis of predicted
threats; national security policies and objectives as they
are discernible; the results of the several Services,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and DoD strategic and tactical
studies.; projections of current and programmed weapons
capabilities, and technological forecasts. This information
is assessed in order to discover significant mission defi-
ciencies. The deficiencies are analyzed and evaluated and
become the basis for each Services* statements of need.
The remainder of this section explores how statements
of need should be written, various sources of perceived
needs and problems that can arise during need evaluation.
Emphasis is placed on analysis of the principal sources of
need perception in an attempt to isolate those factors
which influence Service perceptions of need. Examination
of the requirements process indicated that there are ele-
ments in the sources of need perception used by the Services
to formulate statements of need that may bias these state-
ments and lead to later problems in the acquisition process.
13

Analysis of the information used by Services reveals that
there are four Principal Sources of Need Perception, (see
Figure 2) Each source is examined individually in the
following sections.
B. PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF NEED PERCEPTIONS
1. National Security Policy
National Security Policy is the backdrop against
which all major weapon system decisions are rationalized.
The policy of "containment" and a corresponding strategy
of deterence, now called "realistic deterence," has had a
major influence on general purpose as well as strategic
weapon systems in the years since World War II.
The formulation of national policy is the responsibility
of the President by virtue of power granted to the Chief
Executive by the Constitution and by his role as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces. The National Security Council
is the forum for discussing policy issues. This organiza-
tion provides the basis for presidential policy decisions.
Approved policy documents such as the current defense Policy
and Planning Guidance (PPG) are the source of policy guidance
for the Services. Periodic examples of presidential policy
changes occur at the beginning of a new administration,
although these changes often have their roots in the previous
administration.
General purpose forces are the forces which perform
the entire range of combat operations short of general nu-
clear war while strategic forces are designed to carry out
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How does National Security Council policy guidance
directly affect the determination of requirements? An
examination of some recent policy changes and the resulting
emphasis given to particular missions gives an indication
of how different perceptions of need result from national
policy decisions.
Presidential policy changes in 1953 and 19^9 resulted
in severe defense budget reductions and greatly changed
mission emphasis. During the Eisenhower administration only
the Air Force whole-heartedly embraced the strategy of
"massive retaliation." The Air Force engaged in extensive
aircraft and ballistic missile development, while allowing
its conventional capability to decline. Meanwhile conven-
tional Army and Navy capabilities declined considerably.
The driving force of Eisenhower's policy was reduction of
defense spending rather than a major departure from Truman's
strategy which also emphasized air power and nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless the Eisenhower policy had a tremendous impact
on requirements determination by reemphasizing nuclear
strike retaliatory forces and relying primarily on the Air
Force to achieve this capability.
In 196l the strategy of "flexible response" together
with increased military budgets, saw the restoration of
"balanced" capabilities among the Services. Vulnerability-
reducing measures for hardened and mobile strategic missile
systems that had already been started were accelerated.
Emphasis was placed on improving the capabilities of general
purpose forces and on creating a rapid world wide deployment
16 .

capability for men and material. All of the Services started
extensive new programs to meet the goals of the new policy.
Implications of present policies for the requirements process
are primarily a shift of emphasis away from an exclusive
reliance on complex advanced technology and expensive multi-
mission weapon systems toward a mix with greater numbers
of austere, less expensive weapon systems.
A fundamental problem facing defense planners is inter-
preting national security policy. Documents from the
President and the National Security Council which clearly
state national security objectives have not always been
presented to Defense planning agencies. Specific fiscal
guidance was often not available to JCS and Service planning
agencies. These planning considerations have resulted in
each Service projecting its own estimate of national security
goals. Currently the defense Policy and Planning Guidance
(PPG) prepared by OSD does present presidential and National
Security Council strategic and policy guidance to the Services,
The Policy and Planning Guidance sets forth general defense
policy and objectives for possible contingencies. Various
levels of conflict are specified ranging from strategic
nuclear war to deterrence of local conflict. The draft PPG
is issued in the fall to give the services time to comment
before the final PPG for the budget cycle is issued. [Ref .15]
Another problem related to policy is use of different
planning horizons. The Services and JCS examine national
security issues on a long term basis in order to anticipate
17

threats and to provide essential weapon development lead
times. These planning horizons are being extended even
further than the usual five to eight years in order to
assess the long-term costs of proposed new weapon systems
and their potential impact on the future size of the force
structure. On the other hand, national security policy
is often influenced by short-term political or economic
goals, the pursuit of which can often contradict the long-
term security objectives being pursued by defense planners.
Plans and programs must then be altered, often at consider-
able expense, and accompanied by considerable criticism
of defense planning efforts.
2. Threat Analysis
Another source of needs is the perception of new
or augmented enemy threats. Identification of new threats
is the task of the defense intelligence agencies. These
agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
the National Security Agency (MSA) and the intelligence
staffs of the Services. In addition to the importance of
intelligence estimates in justifying new weapon systems,
intelligence also plays an important role in national
policy formulation. Former Secretary of Defense Laird,
for example, undertook a wholesale review of Defense Depart-
ment intelligence operations in an attempt to correct infor-
mation deficiencies and improve intelligence effectiveness.
One result of this review was the appointment of an Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
18

Intelligence problems of concern to defense planning
agencies included, poor coordination among various intel-
ligence agencies, intelligence estimates that have a
cautious " cover-all-bets*' quality not very useful to plan-
ners and an over-emphasis on foreign capabilities as opposed
to intentions. There is also a disposition among some
intelligence agencies to weigh all intelligence in the
light of an ultimate nuclear war against the Soviet Union.
This produces an unbalanced outlook, making most intelli-
gence seem either inconsequential or overpoweringly impor-
tant. Finally, foreign perceptions of U.S. interests and
possible courses of action in a given situation are fre-
quently left out of intelligence evaluations.
Recognition of deficiencies in intelligence estimates
may be one of the main factors that led to the use of
what former assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems
Analysis, Alain Enthoven, referred to as a "greater than
expected threat" estimate. Enthoven explained how the
"greater than expected threat" is arrived at. "We begin
with the National Intelligence Estimate (the intelligence
community's agreed prediction of likely military develop-
ments) . We then use a planning and analytic device called
the "greater than expected threat." What we do is to
develop a substantially larger threat than the National
These and other intelligence problems encountered by
the Nixon NSC are recounted by Washington journalist John
P. Leacacos in an article published in Foreign Policy ,
Number 5, Winter 1971-1972.
19

Intelligence Estimate shows. This is developed by consulting
various of the experts around the Government." [Ref. 19]
Rationale for using "greater than expected threat"
estimates is that if the Soviets should respond to our new
developments, this response has already been accounted for
by the standard against which we are currently building.
Consequently there would be no need to respond with
additional weapons improvement. In practice, however,
once the Soviets deploy a force which approaches the
current "greater than expected threat," then by definition,
a new "greater than expected threat" is generated and addi-
tional weapon system development is undertaken to meet it.
A current weapon system example may give some insight
into the role of intelligence and threat analysis in
defense planning. The Poseidon missile system was origi-
nally designed to penetrate the Soviet TALLINN system, a
system originally thought to be a widespread ABM defense.
When intelligence agencies determined that TALLINN was an
anti-aircraft system, the deployment decision on Poseidon
was not reversed. The Poseidon deployment decision was
made against a threat which never materialized. Despite
the disappearance of the threat against which it was
designed, the Poseidon was continued as a hedge against
other potential threats, including faster-than-expected
Soviet deployment of the SS-9 ICBM. 1
The sequence of Poseidon system development is based on
testimony given by Dr. John S. Foster, former Director of




The major difficulty with knowingly inflated intelli-
gence estimates of enemy capabilities and use of "greater
than expected threat" estimates is that we tend to "require"
more capability in weapon systems than we need or can afford,
The problem of what contingencies and risks to guard
against is the heart of threat priority analysis. There
are an almost unlimited number of threats which can be
projected. The likelihood of their occurrence however
varies from "significant possibility" to "remote contin-
gency." An attempt to counter all projected threats
would inflate defense requirements beyond our ability to
satisfy them. In addition, once priorities are established,
the degree of complexity and performance capability built
into a system depends to a large extent on an evaluation
of the threat which the weapon is expected to counter.
Statements of need should be written against a back-
ground of realistic threat analysis. Measures to ensure
that the threat is not exaggerated are difficult to describe.
Reviews of stated needs which emphasize both budget con-
straints and realistic projection of enemy capability may
discourage the tendency to request more mission capability
than is fiscally prudent. These reviews should occur at
both Service and OSD levels.
3. New Technology
New or improved technology is another source of
needs and is often closely related to threat analysis.
New technology may allow for improvement in an existing
weapon system. The justification for the improvement may
21

be a hedge against a possible new enemy threat. As tech-
nology advances we project it forward into the Soviet
arsenal, thereby creating new potential contingencies to
be covered by our own forces. New technology also presents
the possibility of designing weapon systems to guard against
contingencies which it had not been previously possible to
protect against.
Continually advancing technology and the apparent risk
aversion of defense planners (exemplified by use of "greater
than expected threat" estimates) have combined to produce
complex, expensive weapon systems in an attempt to cover
all possible contingencies.
Defense Space Market Research , a publication prepared
by businessmen from weapons firms and research organizations
described the defense market for new technology as ". . .a
market in which scientific achievement may be the major
requirement. The intensity of the customers demand may
be far less a function of his available income than of
the products or systems available through technological
advance." [Ref. 23]
A major problem associated with utilization of new
technology has been underestimating the costs of risk and
uncertainty. Costs and uncertainty are greatest when
proposed weapon systems push the frontiers of knowledge.
Current defense efforts aimed at identifying and control-
ling technological risk center around prototyping and
testing. It is possible that these efforts occur too late
22

in the acquisition process unless previous attempts have
been made in Phase I to separate those mission deficiencies
which should be corrected by application of new technology
from application of new technology to achieve those capa-
bilities that might simply be nice to have.
l+. Replacement of Obsolete Equipment
Obsolescence of existing equipment is another source
of needs. Most major acquisition programs are initiated
in order to provide replacements for existing weapons.
Specific requirements for replacements are often assumed
without the benefit of the type of thorough analysis that
a new system might be subjected to.
A case in point is the continuing attempts by the Air
Force to obtain authorization for a strategic bomber to
replace the aging B-52 fleet. (The following account is
not an argument for or against a replacement for the B-52
but merely illustrates the lack of rigorous requirements
determination processes that can occur when replacement
systems are requested.)
Five million dollars was included in the fiscal year
1965 budget for the Air Force to proceed with the program
1
definition phase of a replacement bomber for the B-52.
1The development of a major weapons system ordinarily
follows the following steps: (1) studies to define the need
and concept of employment sufficiently to establish the
desirability of proceeding and to define performance charac-
teristics and requirements in sufficient detail to permit
(2) program definition in which industry makes proposals for
hardware to meet those requirements leading to (3) develop-
ment of actual hardware and, if this development is satis-
factory, (4) procurement of operational quantities.
23

The Air Force, however, had no authority from the Secretary
of Defense to conduct such program definition. During the
preceeding two years the Air Force conducted program
studies to determine just what kind of aircraft they would
like and what its role in the strategic system would be.
These studies concluded that an advanced manned strategic
aircraft was urgently required to complement missile capa-
bilities during the 1970 time period. They explored three
different means of employing manned systems in the strategic
field: one was a high-altitude bomber capable of a role
similar to that for which the B-70 was designed; another
was a long-endurance missile carrier that could remain
aloft for several days; the third was a low altitude pene-
tration bomber. These studies, the concept of operations,
and other proposals required by the Secretary of Defense
prior to making a decision, had not been forwarded to
Secretary McNamara at the time of the authorization and
appropriations hearings o The reason given by General LeMay
was, "because (Secretary McNamara) has asked additional
questions of how we intend to use these bombers, what the
operational concept is going to be, and how many of them
are going to be needed. These are very difficult questions
to answer at this particular time." [Ref . 13] Since
Secretary McNamara had not reviewed these formal proposals
for a follow-on bomber he did not request funds for pro-
gram definition in the fiscal year 1965 budget. General
LeMay, however, felt that the problem was of such urgency
24

that he requested $52 million to conduct program definition
during testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services.
The Armed Services Committee approved the request. Secre-
tary McNamara later urged the House Appropriations Commit-
tee not to approve the request.
The following comment was made by Dr. Harold Brown,
then Director of Department of Defense Research and Engi-
neering. "The project definition would involve a detailed
engineering design. I do not see how you can have a de-
tailed engineering design without a concept of operation
to answer questions such as: Where is this airplane going
to go? How many are there going to be? Where is it going
to be based? You must have that before you to do a project
definition. Maybe the Air Force will have it but I do not
think even they would say they have it now." [Ref . 13]
Obvious deficiencies existed in Air Force follow-on bomber
program planning. In the above example the "product ori-
ented" statement of need was rejected at the Secretary of
Defense level (although Congress did provide the $52 million
for the program). A better solution to this and similar
problems lies in improving the planning and review process
at the Service Chief or Service Secretary level in order
to filter out obvious service bias. This particular bias
frequently assumes that there is a "requirement" to replace
existing major systems with succeeding generations of
similar systems on a one for one basis. Seldom are alter-
native systems proposed by the services. Seldom is
25

increased performance achieved in succeeding generations
of weapons systems used by the Services to justify a
reduction in the number of aircraft, ships or missiles.
C. INFLUENCING FACTORS FOR NEED DETERMINATIONS
l a Interservice Rivalry
A persistent problem in the broad area of require-
ments determination is Service competition for roles and
missions and for the budget dollars to support these
missions. A commonly held belief is that prior to World
War II competition for roles and missions was non-existant
.
The rationale for this belief is that each Service's con-
trol of specific weapon systems was determined by the
medium through which it moved—land, sea or air. The
assertion is that modern technology and the nuclear age
upset this "natural" mission separation. The following
example, which occurred in the 1930' s, illustrates that
neither the problem of overlapping roles and missions nor
the all too common "solution" is just a post-war phenomenon,
The dispute of the Army and Navy over air power
was by no means academic. It was often expressed
in seemingly trivial terms—for example, minor
overlaps in functions such as the operation of
patrol planes—but behind the facade of details
lay a fundamental struggle for power. Navy
spokesmen held that "sea operations" were
"inherently" a function of the Navy ...
whether ... carried out by surface ships,
subsurface ships, or aircraft. Army repre-
sentatives with little confidence in the
future of strategic bombers might be will-
ing to concede this much, but how could they
accept the Navy contention that "money spent
on our Army could, with more profit toward
guarding our continental coastline, be spent
in augmenting naval strength . . ."? With
26

so much in the way of pay, promotion, the hope of
command, and the whole question of career tied
up in the matter, it was difficult for either
Army or Navy officers to take an utterly detached
view.
Unable to reach any fundamental agreement on
doctrine, Army and Navy officials resorted to an
old formula: they would agree to disagree. All
controversial discussions of Army-Navy operations,
warned a General Staff officer, should be studiously
avoided. This was the essence of the "solution":
solve the problem by virtually ignoring it. High-
ranking officers contrived an accord only by defin-
ing the respective missions of the services in very
general terms that avoided exploring the areas of
overlap too closely, and once this "agreement" was
drawn, they fended off every effort to reopen the
question. [Ref. 11]
It is not unusual that each Service should see in an
existing or developing enemy threat predominantly those
elements which its own particular organization seems best
adapted to counter. Each service by a natural rationali-
zation judges the proper balance of forces to be the one
which maximizes its own role. Differing views of mission
responsibility may or may not be properly labeled "paro-
chialism" on the part of the Services. More important
than labeling Service reactions is eliminating unplanned,
uncontrolled, unaffordable duplication of weapon systems
and wastage of scarce resources. Answers to the problems
of interservice rivalry become urgent as the defense budget
declines. There is no justification for the services to
give responsible observers the basis to claim that, "more
time and energy has been expended at the policy-making
levels of the three armed services on who is going to do




Tactical air warfare is a current example of an area
where service missions overlap. The recent controversy
involving the Army Cheyenne helicopter, the Air Force AX
(now A-10) aircraft and Marine British built AV-8A Harrier
aircraft illustrates contemporary service competition for
roles and missions. The controversy has not been resolved
although the Cheyenne program was terminated in 1973* The
Army is now requesting funds for an advanced attack
helicopter (AAH).
Proposed solutions to the problems of interservice
rivalry range from creation of a single service to revision
of the Key West agreement. An alternative approach
utilizing the existing DoD organization is presented in
the Conclusions and Recommendations section.
2. Defense Industry Marketing
Some systems come into being as a result of the
initiative of government contractors. A contractor may
develop a new weapon system approach and propose it to
an agency in DoD. In this case a new or innovative con-
cept introduced by a contractor may induce a product oriented
statement of need. If the "need" generates a firm require-
ment it will be for a specified system. While in retrospect
the resulting system may function properly, the question
should be asked whether the system fulfilled a need or if
the need was created to justify the desirability of having
"T'he Key West Agreement of 194$ was an attempt to assign




the system. A former president of the Air Force Association
claimed:
The day is past when the military requirement
for a major weapons system is set up by the mili-
tary and passed on to industry to build the hard-
ware. Today it is more likely that the military
requirement is the result of joint participation
of military and industrial personnel, and it is
not unusual for the industry's contribution to be
a key factor. Indeed, there are highly placed
military men who sincerely feel that industry
currently is setting the pace in the research
and development of new weapons systems. [Ref . 19]
To what extent does the government depend on the con-
tractors' engineers for the perception and resolution of
"system answers," whether formulated by the government or
a potential supplier? There is a legitimate dependency
on the private sector to propose solutions to solve mili-
tary needs; but it is imperative that the Services have
the "in-house capacity" to analyze the potential contri-
bution industry sponsored weapon systems can make in
satisfying valid mission deficiencies.
D. PROBLEM SUMMARY
There have been several persistent problems associated
with generation of formal statements of need. The problem
of product oriented statements of need currently is being
addressed by revising Service program planning and initia-
tion policies. The proposed policies appear to emphasize
stating needs in terms of capabilities and concepts rather
than systems and hardware,,
A second major problem, that of inadequate national
security policy and fiscal guidance to the Services, is
29

being addressed by use of the Policy and Planning Guidance
document. Several other serious problems remain in Phase
I however. These problems are biases that are associated
with need perceptions e The problems are summarized below.
Their cumulative effect is to cause the services to ask
for more capability than is actually necessary to eliminate
mission deficiencies.
a. An upward bias resulting from intelligence
that may overestimate enemy capabilities.
b. An upward bias resulting from use of
"greater than expected" threat analysis.
c. An upward bias resulting from indiscriminate
reaction to advanced technology,,
d. An upward bias resulting from service desires
for a one for one replacement of existing
systems.
How these problems may interact and influence each other
is illustrated in Figure 3o
III. SELECTION OF REQUIREMENTS
A. DISCUSSION
The second phase of the requirements determination
process is the response of military and industrial research
and development effort generated by the statement of needed
capability. The response draws upon a technology base to
support exploration of areas leading to possible conceptual
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These conceptual ideas may include different system designs
to meet similar missions. The alternatives may be limited
to different engineering approaches to produce a single
system concept. However if alternatives are not considered
the requirements determination process may be constrained
unduly. Frequently this locks us into single system
approaches which produce great cost growth, schedule slip-
pages and performance shortfall problems in system produc-
tion contracts.
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Research and Development (R&D) program has two
objectives. A long range goal is to advance technology
in scientific fields that have some application to defense.
The second goal is to provide answers to specific develop-
ment problems. The Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) is the principal advisor to the Secre-
tary of Defense on scientific and technical matters. DDR&E
has been directed to supervise the management of R&D in DoD,
To facilitate the management of the R&D program, DDR&E
has divided it into six categories. The first three of
these categories influence greatly the determination of
how requirements could be fulfilled. (See Fig. 5)
1. Defense Research
Defense Research (Category 6.1) is scientific
study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowl-














































to defense programs. It should provide fundamental knowledge
for the solution of identified military problems but should
not be directed to support predetermined weapon system
solutions.
2. Exploratory Development
Exploratory Development (Category 6.2) should build
upon this basic knowledge and begin to apply it to hardware
development in support of conceptual approaches to solve
defense needs. This effort should begin to develop and
evaluate the feasibility and practicability of proposed
alternatives.
3. Advanced Development
Advanced Development (Category 6 C 3) is directed
at proving a design concept and may include the building
of models to test the system feasibility. DSARC I for
the initiation of a program usually takes place around
the middle of advanced development. At that decision
point the development should be advanced sufficiently to
allow selection of a system approach from alternative
approaches.
4. R&D Management
The problem of managing R&D is a formidable one.
A structure of management controls has been established
by DDR&E to aid in this task. The Technology Coordinating
Paper (TCP) describes what can be done with existing
technology, defines priorities for work on new technology




and presents plans for doing the essential work. The
Area Coordinating Paper (ACP) is a mission-oriented paper
that discusses what is being done in R&D in specific
mission areas.
The JCS, in their role of advising the Secretary of
Defense on R&D matters prepares a Joint Research and
Development Objectives Directive (JRDOD). This document
identifies specific deficiencies in the DoD R&D objectives
and provides indicators of the relative military importance
of ongoing R&D programs. Inputs to this document come
from the Services and the Unified commands.
Each individual service provides for the actual con-
duct of R&D efforts to support the mission needs. To
provide for effective management of this effort, an exten-
sive planning and monitoring system has been established.
The planning documents are designed to interface with the
Joint Program for Planning. The monitoring documents
include various documents that track what is being done
in each category of R&D, showing what system development
can be supported and what technological developments are
expected in the future.
C. PROBLEM OF SPECIFYING A SINGLE-SYSTEM APPROACH PREMATURELY
The second phase of the requirements determination
process should be responding to a statement of need.
Whether this is a statement of mission deficiency or a
specified design approach has a significant effect on how
systems are generated. When the process is constrained
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to a specified approach at this very early stage, the
opportunity for innovation and introduction of alternative
concepts is minimalo
t/ The technology base must be developed through efforts
of government laboratories, universities and contractors
conducting general research and exploratory development
work. These activities are funded with a relatively small
portion of the R&D budget. How this money is spent becomes
very important if a good technology base is to support the
demands of advanced development.
The managers of this early R&D effort generally have
a motivation to supply what a user "demands." If the
demand is for new systems which are little more than
improved versions of old systems, this motivation will
cause early R&D efforts to be directed toward developing
improved subsystems and components. A constrained budget
may not allow both subsystems development and technology
base development. Since many new systems today are
developed from the beginning as a better version of an
existing system, the early research effort may suffer in
favor of subsystem development or stretching old technology
to meet new perceptions. This problem is compounded by
a shrinking budget in the 6.1 and 6.2 categories.
Even with an adequate technology base, alternative
approaches will not be developed when the process is con-
strained by a specified design approach in the statement
of need. Many new systems are replacements for similar
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systems. This is not in itself evidence that alternatives
should not be considered. For many missions there may be
only one type of system that will be acceptable. However,
an early decision on the exact design approach will rule
out possible engineering innovation to introduce more
efficient ways to build the system. The easiest and often
the only possibility examined is to make all the components
of an old system "a little better." New technology may
even present an entirely new approach to perform a mission,
but such new methods will never be examined if the design
approach is dictated in the statement of need.
Time, money or political factors often cause the process
to "choose" the pre-determined system. If the need for a
new capability is critical or if there is not enough money
to spend on pursuing alternatives, the easy answer seems
to be to begin development with the specified approach.
Decisions like this are made looking only at the needs
imposed in a short time frame. A premature choice of a
system approach may involve technical risk that may lead
to both cost and schedule growth in the long run. This
type of difficulty in the later acquisition process might
be averted by spending more money in early development to
reduce the degree of technical uncertainty and increase
the range of alternatives from which to choose.
Even when several approaches are outlined, the choice
of the preferred design may be made on the basis of inade-
quate studies. DoD has moved away from parallel development
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in most programs because they have deemed it too expensive.
Contractors often are unwilling or unable to fund unsolicited
development for the same financial reason. As a result of
these economic considerations a contractor is selected
early in "development" and the design is usually dictated
in the contract. Frequently this contract is written
before the specifications can be well defined. As a
result problems arise during development and production
but the Government finds itself in a "sole-source" situation.
Since there is no other immediate source to fulfill the
requirements, the Government must now issue change orders
to correct any deficiencies in the premature design.
These change orders are frequently the source of much
cost growth and long schedule delays.
D. HOW ALTERNATIVES COULD BE DEVELOPED
As a result of the tendency to select a system too
early, alternative system approaches often are not con-
sidered. The development of these alternatives should
mean independent approaches to solve a problem. There
are several ways to obtain independent approaches. This
effort can be done in-house using laboratories or by
assigning one laboratory as a technical director who would
supervise soliciting proposals from industry.
Each Service maintains laboratories that specialize
in certain areas of R&D. If the need statement is written
in terms of a mission deficiency more than one of these
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laboratories may have the expertise to apply their re-
search efforts to sponsor a design concept.
If alternatives are not forthcoming from in-house
laboratories, a procedure similar to the contract defini-
tion process might generate system approaches from indus-
try. In this application the request for proposals would
be stated in broad problem terms. Any promising replies
to the proposal should then be funded for further develop-
ment. This funding should continue until the approach
proves inefficient or shows enough feasibility to warrant
higher levels of effort. This second approach brings
industry into the process early with flexibility to use
their design ability to create new ideaso
If more than one approach survives this early develop-
ment effort, a decision must be made as to whether to
continue the parallel efforts or to pick one approach.
This decision should be delayed until it can be made on
a basis of relative technical certainty about the
approaches.
E. CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE
There are two basic methods to choose among alternatives,
The choice may be based on an analysis relating the design
or conceptual approaches to the relative technical risk
involved. It may also be based on the results of testing
prototype hardware of competing approaches.
The emphasis in the 1960's was on Systems Analysis as
a basis for the selection of systems to fulfill requirements.
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The shortcoming of this type of study is that it includes
many uncertainties which cannot be anticipated by initial
formulation of the problem. The element of judgement is
very great and is very dependent on the initial assumptions
made. When these assumptions are made in isolation of
operational elements they are very prone to error. Systems
analysis is very valuable to help define the problem but
paper studies do not adequately anticipate the technical
and financial risk.
The second approach allows the development of two or
more design concepts to continue until a hardware proto-
type can be constructed and tested. The results of this
testing can then be used to make the decisions on further
development. Such decisions could involve picking one
design, none of them, or a decision to continue more
development and testing before making a final decision.
The disadvantage to the prototype method is the cost
involved. However, money spent at this early stage of
development can do much to ensure choosing the correct
system and being able to solve technical problems before
costly engineering development begins.
F. CONCLUSION
The results of this phase, however conducted, produce
a proposed requirement. The Service conducts the develop-
ment of a system until such time as it is determined that
a major defense system program should be pursued. The plan
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for the program is outlined in a Development Concept
Paper and submitted to the DSARC for consideration and
the Secretary of Defense for a decision. Phase III dis-
cusses the aspects of this Secretary of Defense decision.
IV. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE APPROVAL
The National Security Act of 1947 and the subsequent
Defense Reorganization Acts created and strengthened the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to enable him to
exercise direction, authority and control over the entire
Department of Defense. The power given to the office is
sufficient to allow the Secretary to control the separate
Services so as to serve the accomplishment of a total
defense mission.
There have been two basic management philosophies
described by students of defense management. One style
emphasizes strong central decision making while the second
allows more decision making by the Service Chiefs. The
type of management employed by the Secretary may have a
large impact on how weapon systems are conceived and
developed.
The McNamara years were characterized by strong control
of the weapon acquisition process. In some cases, such
as the F-lll airplane, the momentum for a new program
came from the Secretary and not the Service. Service
planning was sometimes changed without procedures for
appeal. This type of control produced dissatisfaction
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within the Services. As a result of this dissatisfaction,
the Services reverted to open dissent with the Secretary
of Defense. Critics contended that the morale of military
leaders and Service Secretaries had fallen; that military
judgement and professional expertise had been downgraded;
that arbitrary centralization and standardization made
for mediocrity and the loss of creative values that should
stem from initiative, variety and debate. [Ref. 14]
Prior to the McNamara years the Services had often
been given more freedom to control the requirements deci-
sion making process. This was due, in part, to the strength
given the individual Services before the reorganization
acts of 1955 and 1958. This lack of significant control
resulted in service rivalry, unnecessary duplication in
development, and general disagreement on how best to
satisfy the total needs of national defense.
The present method of defense management seems to be
a compromise between the two extremes described above.
The "milestone decision-making process" used in major
weapon system acquisition is an example of this management
philosophy. The DSARC system allows the Services to con-
duct the acquisition process in an independent manner while
OSD imposes control at three specific decision points.
The Services must have each major program reviewed and
approved prior to the initiation of a major phase in the
acquisition process; program initiation, full-scale
development and production. These reviews are conducted
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by the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
and the decisions are made by the Secretary of Defense.
This process is an excellent example of decentralizing
responsibility and authority while maintaining visibility
and control of the Service efforts. The major deficiency
of the process is that it does not monitor the requirements
determination process. The first DSARC decision does not
occur until after the Service in effect has chosen a system
approach to fulfill a stated need.
Since conceptual effort is conducted within each
Service, actual requirements determination process may
not receive effective review and reconciliation at the
OSD level. The Services define needs and conduct the
early development that leads to the selection of a system
approach. This selection is made independent of OSD
review. There is therefore little motivation in the
Services to furnish information to OSD about alternate
design concepts that were rejected. This lack of informa-
tion increases the chance that the Secretary of Defense
may approve the Services initiation of a systems choice.
Since the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the
Defense budget request, he must insure that all program
decisions are made in concert. When a program receives
his approval it is added to the procurement budget request.
This program is reviewed by the Authorization and Appropria-
tion committees of both Houses of Congress. When members
of Congress question him on the validity of programs, the
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Secretary's defense of it depends on the information he
has received. Under today's procedures he would seem to
have very little information regarding viable alternatives
for a recommended program.
How Congress reacts to budget requests also depends
on the information available to it. The next section
discusses the Congressional review of the defense budget.
V. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
It is the task of Congress under the Constitution to
raise the armed forces. In the requirements determination
process, however, the role of Congress has been an after
the fact, fiscal approval or disapproval of weapon systems
proposed by DoD. In order to exert some measure of control
over major weapon systems and the defense policies which
they are intended to implement, DoD programs are subject
to two types of approval in both the House and Senate.
Congress passes substantive legislation both authorizing
specific programs and providing appropriations in their
support.
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees conduct
hearings on research and development, ships, aircraft,
missiles and other major weapon systems. Witnesses before
these hearings may include the Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the JCS, Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
These witnesses deliver general posture statements and
answer questions posed by the Committee members. Both
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committees report out a bill to their respective assemblies.
Differences, if any, go to conference for a final compromise
bill which is again voted by each house of Congress.
The Appropriations hearings of the Defense Subcommittees
of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees begin
in the House. The final House report is sent to the Senate
Committee. The final bills go to a joint conference and
a compromise bill is finally delivered out of Congress.
Analysis of Congressional action indicates which areas
appear most important to the members. The greatest
percentage changes to the defense budget have been in
Procurement and Research Development Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E). This indicates that Congress is interested in
new defense programs. Other areas that draw Congressional
interest are perceived changes in the international
environment such as the "missile gap" or "bomber gap."
How proposed systems may influence U.S. military commitments
or policy such as the Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (FDL)
also draw Congressional interest. Congress also watches
carefully the multibillion dollar systems that absorb the
greatest expenditure of resources.
The major issue with the existing role of Congress in
the requirements process is that Congress has poor visibility
of defense mission deficiencies and the early defense
decisions on programs designed to eliminate those deficien-
cies. This may result in a general lack of confidence on
the part of Congress in supporting defense objectives.
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Congress has no way to assure itself that fiscal support
to proposed major weapons systems will indeed contribute
to satisfying defense needs. The present lengthy authori-
zation and appropriations hearings reflect a desire on
the part of Congress to gain confidence in supporting
defense needs. A better way to achieve Congressional
confidence is for DoD to give Congress early visibility
of perceived defense mission deficiencies, to assure
Congress that real alternatives are being created to address
those deficiencies and that final requirements determinations
follow the accumulation of hard data regarding these
alternatives.
Congressional review and approval of R&D budgets should
be premised on the creation of alternatives to meet mission
needs and explicit Congressional understanding of the
mission deficiencies these needs are to serve,,
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BACKGROUND
The Thesis is intended as a conceptual problem state-
ment regarding the function of requirement determination
rather than as an across the board attempt to reconcile
all current programs to a single decision making standard.
While individual programs are used to illustrate aspects
of the requirement determination function it is not the
intention of this thesis to address characteristics of
programs which follow naturally from a basic decision
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making process, but to examine the process itself. With
the initial focus on the requirements determination process,
problems and recommendations for solutions can be approached
syst emat i cally
.
B. SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS
Formal statements of need originate at the Service
level based on national policy objectives, threat assess-
ments and/or perceived mission deficiencies. These state-
ments too often describe a design concept for a specific
system rather than a description of a mission deficiency
which warrants the examination of alternative solutions.
Moreover, these statements often are not satisfactorily
coordinated among the Services and there is little evidence
that they are subsequently prioritized by OSD or OMB to
reflect Defense needs on an overall basis and the relation-
ship to other Government program objectives.
The process of establishing needs is often biased to
demand more capability than is really needed. The intel-
ligence community tends to predict an optimum threat.
Contractors predict the ability to produce a greatly
increased capability in order to win contracts. The
Services may demand systems that meet an exaggerated threat
using the optimistic supplier estimates of greatly enhanced
capability. The net result is that we may be demanding




There is no effective mechanism to appraise Congress
of the rationale behind an aggregate of mission needs
and their relative priority. The request for appropriations
of R&D money is not premised on an analysis of mission
areas or the interrelationship of problems to be solved,
but rather on individual program items that are thought
to be important in themselves.
Because a statement of need usually anticipates a
design approach, there is little opportunity for the
development of alternatives to the specified approach.
This practice stifles the selection in the requirements
phase of the acquisition process and leaves very little
room for innovation and change.
The result of a premature selection of a system has
several ultimate effects. Efforts to develop a strong
technology base independent of supporting specific
systems are discouraged. The motivation in research and
exploratory development may be to take a very narrow course
toward improving components and subsystems of existing
hardware.
The premature selection of a system concept usually
leads to decisions to initiate a contract and start
advanced development as early as possible. This decision
may be made in spite of major technical uncertainties.
As a result system development is frequently plagued with
major design revisions leading to change orders, increased
cost and schedule delays.
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The Secretary of Defense must confirm a Service
decision to initiate a program and have it included in
the Five Year Defense Plan. The Secretary of Defense
decision is made at DSARC I. The decision is based on
the assumed technical feasibility of the proposed system
without necessarily considering whether the Service made
a selection from a range of real alternatives. The DSARC I
decision may be made without regard to current or proposed
efforts by other Services related to the same mission area.
By the time Congress is asked for prototype and/or
production money for a specific system, the design approach
is firm and alternative courses of action are really no
longer considered. The choice given to Congress is to
accept the one "best" answer perceived by the Service or
potentially leave the mission deficiency unanswered.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Background
The authors feel that the overriding problem in
the requirements determination process is the great tend-
ency towards "product-oriented" statements of need. The
premature designation of a system approach seriously con-
strains the entire acquisition process. The solution is
to require stronger management direction of the existing
process within the Services and between the Services and OSD.
The Services all produce statements of need. There
is some effort at coordination among the Services. The
existing JRDOD and the Mission Concept Papers both should
49

examine the efforts in R&D by mission area. However this
recent effort at coordination has not yet shown that it
will ensure that statements of needs will define mission
deficiencies and elicit alternative system approaches.
2. Recommendation I
OSD should conduct an annual review of the state-
ments of need produced by the Services .
The preparation of a statement of need and the prior-
ities in each mission category should be done by the
Services with coordination among the Services by the JCS.
The Service review should support the Program Objective
Memorandum and the JCS coordination should be reflected
in the Joint Forces Memorandum. Annual statements of
these mission needs could then be submitted to review by
OSD. A panel similar to the DSARC but meeting in advance
of the current DSARC I would be the proper level for this
review. This review should ensure that the statements of
need are stipulations of mission deficiencies that are
defined against a reasonable threat prediction. The
requested mission capability should be in agreement with
current national policy as interpreted by the Secretary
of Defense in the Policy and Planning Guidance Memorandum,
The report of this review group should be forwarded to
the Secretary of Defense for approval. The report could
also serve as the basis to review the entire research and
exploratory development program. The R&D budget should
represent, in part, a summary of the review of statements
50

of need for use by the Authorization and Appropriation
Committees to make decisions regarding the purpose and
validity of R&D appropriations.
3. Recommendation II
Each Service prepare a document similar to a DCP
,
defining the approach that will be used to explore design
alternatives for each stated need and the method that will
be used to select the system approach .
One of the major problems in the requirements deter-
mination process is that a system design may be prematurely
selected and alternative approaches may not be considered.
Early emphasis on dealing with capability deficiencies
rather than defining specific answers will encourage
alternative approaches to the mission capability. This
emphasis on alternatives could be encouraged through the
use of a Service-produced document similar to the Develop-
ment Concept Paper (DCP). The focus of this DCP should
be the standards to be used in promoting alternative
design concepts and the criteria for selecting among
alternatives. In those areas where Service DCP's indicate
there is commonality of effort which may result in inter-
service rivalry, DDR&E should coordinate the decision
effort through the establishment of a joint development
program or by assigning responsibility for that capability
to a single Service.
A DCP of this type should be written in response to
a statement of need. It should outline the procedure to
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be followed to develop independent design approaches
(eg in-house development, competing contractors, etc.),
and whether prototypes or paper studies will be used to
pick the final Service selection of a system to meet the
need.
The DCP's produced by all the Services in a given
mission area should be reviewed by OSD. Particular atten-
tion should be given to these DCP's at the annual review
of statements of needs. Consideration must be given to
the balance between the effort outlined in these DCP's,
the prioritization of needs and the existing programs in
the advanced stages of development. This type of examina-
tion should support the R&D budget request.
4. Recommendation III
DSARC 1 should reemphasize the following criteria :
1. What effort has been made to develop
alternatives to the design concept chosen.
2. What is the criteria for picking a
concept
.
3. What other efforts are in progress in
this mission area and what is this
system's relationship to these.
4. Does this system fulfill a valid mission
deficiency.
The decision at DSARC I emphasizes the technical
aspects of the proposed system to determine whether
sufficient progress has been made in development to
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justify the additional funds for advanced development.
This decision is important, however it should not be the
only criteria for approving the selection of a system
approach to meet a mission need. To ensure that this
decision is not premature an examination of the available
alternatives that have been developed should also be made.
If the effort to explore independent alternative approaches
has not been pursued sufficiently, the proper decision
should be to delay the transition to a major program
until other design concepts may be examinedo The results
of the analysis performed to pick the final approach
should also be part of the review at DSARC I. The examina-
tion of alternatives should include a review of other
Service's efforts in the same mission area. The DCP
would be a good vehicle to make this review.
An examination of a proposed system choice should
include a comparison of the mission capabilities specified
to the stated mission need. The assumptions that precip-
itated the need should also be examined to insure that
the statement of need is still valid. While the require-
ment to fulfill the minimum capability is important, the
DSARC should also guard against the approval of a system
concept that provides for more capability than is required.
A summary of this DSARC I review, subject to approval
by the Secretary of Defense, could be used as a justifi-
cation for the inclusion of a new program in the procure-
ment budget. Such a report could include in one document
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the need for the system, the alternatives considered, the
justification for picking a single-system approach, and
what effort is being carried on by other Services in the
same mission area.
5. Conclusion
These recommendations are designed to correct
deficiencies in the requirements determination process by
introducing three specific improvements:
a. Outlines the method to provide adequate OSD
review of the statements of need to ensure mission-oriented
needs that reflect a reasonable statement of required capa-
bility in light of current policy, possible threat, and
prudent fiscal demands;
b. Emphasizes a thorough exploration of definable
alternatives and adequate measures to select the most
efficient system approach from these alternatives; and
c. Provides OSD and Congressional visibility in
the early stages of the requirements determination process;
thereby motivating the Services to improve their procedures
and to provide a better foundation for these agencies to
approve or deny the Services' requests for new programs.
These recommendations could accomplish these improve-
ments without the need for new agencies or new procedures.
The basic change suggested here is to put emphasis on
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